It\u27s Always Sunny in Florida: Reexamining the Role of Energy Monopolies After Recent Solar Ballot Initiatives by Gillespie, Lauren
William & Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review
Volume 42 | Issue 3 Article 9
It's Always Sunny in Florida: Reexamining the Role
of Energy Monopolies After Recent Solar Ballot
Initiatives
Lauren Gillespie
Copyright c 2018 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmelpr
Repository Citation
Lauren Gillespie, It's Always Sunny in Florida: Reexamining the Role of Energy Monopolies After Recent
Solar Ballot Initiatives, 42 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol'y Rev. 1051 (2018),
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmelpr/vol42/iss3/9
IT’S ALWAYS SUNNY IN FLORIDA: REEXAMINING THE




In Florida, the reign of state-sponsored monopolies stalls intuitive
renewable energy upgrades. Despite being the “Sunshine State,” Florida
lags behind the curve in solar technology.1 Some power companies take
advantage of tax credits to install solar panels, but bizarre laws limit ac-
cess for homeowners and small business owners. But recently, Floridians
turned to their lawmakers for help. Citizen-activists proposed Amendment
Four [hereinafter known as pro-solar amendment] to eliminate taxes on
renewable energy devices.2 After a bipartisan grassroots campaign, the
Florida Constitution was amended to guarantee citizens access to solar
energy free from burdensome regulations.3 This pro-solar amendment
was a victory for idealistic citizens, environmentalists, economic conser-
vatives, Republicans and Democrats.4
Almost immediately after this local victory, entrenched monopolies
proposed a new amendment.5 This Amendment One [hereinafter known
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1 Ben Zientara, What’s the matter with solar in Florida?, SOLAR POWER ROCKS (last
visited Apr. 4, 2018), https://solarpowerrocks.com/florida/florida-solar-power-problems [https:
//perma.cc/8B6Q-S4HY] (noting that Florida ranks 24th out of 50 states in terms of so-
lar advancement).
2 Sun Sentinel Editorial Board, For Solar, vote yes on Amendment 4, SUN SENTINEL
(Aug. 19, 2016), http://www.sun-sentinel.com/opinion/endorsements/fl-editorial-solar-amend
ment-4-vote-yes-20160819-story.html [https://web.archive.org/web/*/http://www.sun-sen
tinel.com/opinion/endorsements/fl-editorial-solar-amendment-4-vote-yes-20160819-story




5 David Roberts, Florida’s outrageously deceptive solar ballot initiative, explained, VOX
(Nov. 8, 2016), https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2016/11/4/13485164/florida-amend
ment-1-explained [https://perma.cc/5827-HT4E] (calling the Amendment a “utility’s scam”).
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as pro-utility amendment] proposes that: “State and local governments
shall retain their abilities to protect consumer rights and public health,
safety and welfare, and to ensure that consumers who do not choose to
install solar are not required to subsidize the costs of backup power and
electric grid access to those who do.”6
To the lay person (and even to some experts), this pro-utility
amendment seemed to support solar energy and citizens’ rights.7 In reality,
the entrenched energy companies proposed this malicious and deceptive
amendment.8 The goal of the amendment was to stop progress and main-
tain the energy companies’ monopolies forever. Luckily, the citizens of
Florida recognized the “wolf in sheep’s clothing,”9 as one Florida Supreme
Court judge described Amendment One. The same majority of citizens
who mobilized for the pro-solar amendment showed up in force to tear
down the pro-utility amendment.10 Even Florida’s Firefighters Associa-
tion condemned the tricky amendment after they were duped into filming
a commercial for the pro-utility amendment.11 Still, it is a travesty that the
big businesses were even allowed to broach this nonsensical restriction
on solar energy. Furthermore, the companies did not just propose a
law—they attempted to make permanent changes by amending Florida’s
constitution, which is notoriously difficult to alter.12 This desperate power
grab reveals that renewable energy terrifies traditional power compa-
nies. It also shows how entangled these monopolies are in the fabric of
state governments.
This battle of amendments is a proxy for a larger struggle—the
struggle over who determines Florida’s energy future. If people have a right
to energy, do they also have a right to produce energy? Do they have a right
to decide how others will produce energy for them? Citizens, businesses,
6 Advisory Op. to the Att’y Gen. re Rights of Elec. Consumers Regarding Solar Energy
Choice, 180 So. 3d 822, 826 (Fla. 2016).
7 Id. at 827.
8 Id. at 834–35.
9 Id. at 835.
10 Mary Ellen Klas, Florida voters say no to misleading solar amendment, MIAMI HERALD
(Nov. 8, 2016), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/politics-government/election/article
113449438.html [https://perma.cc/4K8K-PEGT].
11 Mary Ellen Klas, Firefighters withdraw their endorsement of Amendment 1, MIAMI
HERALD (Nov. 5, 2016), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/politics-government/state-poli
tics/article112764713.html [https://perma.cc/WWT2-46XD].
12 Patrick Quinlan, Why Vote ‘No’ on Florida’s Constitutional Amendments? It’s the right
choice, SEARCY LAW BLOG (Sept. 14, 2012), https://www.searcylaw.com/why-vote-no-on
-floridas-constitutional-amendments-its-the-right-choice/ [https://perma.cc/U537-7HEG]
(explaining “[O]nce an idea is written into the Florida Constitution, then the ability to make
adjustments is substantially limited and the process is cumbersome.”).
2018] IT’S ALWAYS SUNNY IN FLORIDA 1053
and environmental groups want to make choices about solar energy while
entrenched power companies want to move at their own restrictive paces.
Historically, Americans have had little influence in how their
energy is manufactured. Once energy became industrialized in the eigh-
teenth and nineteenth centuries, production was subject only to market in-
fluences and free from personal preference.13 Other costs, such as the cost
to the environment, were externalized.14 As jurisprudence addressed (and
dismissed) possible anti-trust problems, energy companies became more
and more entangled in the fabric of states. This system continued through-
out American history with little variation. A notable exception occurred
at the turn of the century in California.15 After California’s experiment
with deregulation, energy companies enjoyed relatively peaceful reigns.
Florida’s current energy system is rife with bad incentives that
maintain the status quo. While short term legal fixes could allow for the in-
tegration of solar power in Florida despite bad incentives, an overall strat-
egy should embrace a right to personal determination in terms of energy
production to truly spur innovate renewable energy. This is, after all,
what Floridians have demanded in the newly minted solar choice state
constitutional amendment.
In economic parlance, bad incentives exist when a rational actor
must weigh the chance of increased profits against harm to a common
good.16 Federal anti-trust law is designed to constrain bad incentives.17
If applied to Florida, the law would preclude Florida power companies
from creating monopolies and yet, monopolies exist. The Sherman Act was
designed to prevent the very harm that occurs in Florida. However, fed-
eral law does not apply to states in some instances. Because federal law
does not apply, states control. Some scholars argue that federal law should
apply (by reawakening the dormant commerce clause),18 but my Note
takes a different approach.
13 Jeffery Schwartz, The Use of the Antitrust State Action Doctrine in the Deregulated Elec-
tric Utility Industry, 48 AM. U.L. REV. 1449 (1999).
14 Id.
15 Steven Ferrey, Soft Paths, Hard Choices: Environmental Lessons in the Aftermath of
California’s Electric Deregulation Debacle, 23 VA. ENVTL. L. J. 251, 254–55 (2004).
16 See generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules,
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. R. 1089 (1972).
17 DEP’T OF JUSTICE & THE FTC, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 1 (2010), https://www
.justice.gov/atr/horizontal-merger-guidelines-08192010 [https://perma.cc/YHW4-FN37].
18 See generally Barbara Bruckmann, The Case for a Commerce Clause Challenge to State
Antitrust Laws Banning Minimum Resale Price Maintenance, 39 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 391
(2012); Michael Ruttinger, Is There a Dormant Extraterritoriality Principle?: Commerce
Clause Limits on State Antitrust Laws, 106 MICH. L. REV. 545 (2007).
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Certain companies within states are given much more room to
maneuver than companies governed strictly by federal law. The Supreme
Court outlined a State Action Doctrine, which details how monopolies
can exist in states despite preemptive (superior) federal law. These mo-
nopolies were allowed because energy and other utilities formed a “natu-
ral monopoly.” However, as renewable energy technology advances, this
justification becomes less convincing.
Like most state energy schemes, Florida’s relationship falls within
the State Action Doctrine. Florida continues a regulatory scheme closely
linked with utility companies. The state exerts only gradual changes to reg-
ulations for improved access to solar energy and other renewable sources.
Florida Public Service Commission (“FPSC”) regulates energy companies.
Though changes have occurred, Florida still lags behind other states in
allowing innovation. This is mostly because of one court case, PW Ventures
v. Nichols, in which the Florida Supreme Court severely limited access
to a common-sense financing options for solar energy.
After defining Florida’s monopoly system, I will identify some is-
sues in Florida’s application of State Action Doctrine. First, the FPSC gives
energy companies far-reaching ability to restrain competition. On a re-
lated note, the FPSC also faces claims of corruption.
Still, it is important to note that the FPSC was formed for valid
reasons. First, the FPSC has an economic duty to prevent duplicative ef-
forts. Next, FPSC has a quasi-civil rights role of protecting the energy
supply of all socio-economic classes. As alternative energy developed, some
states rethought their relationship; specifically, California attempted to
deregulate their energy sector. Their experiment provides a nice example
of the benefits of the state action doctrine and contrasts to Florida’s own
relationship with state-sponsored energy monopolies.
Understanding these justifications, this Note will offer recommen-
dations for fixing bad incentives within the current framework of Florida’s
energy sector. First, the giant utilities should become decentralized to
ensure loyal service to a community. Second, Florida should join other
states in our nation by allowing third-party power purchasing agree-
ments in some form. While most critics of Florida’s energy sector clamor
for tax incentives, this Note will discuss some issues caused by solely
relying on tax breaks to produce solar energy.
Finally, I will discuss long-term fixes for the bad incentives that
are pervasive in Florida. First, give Floridians the agency to determine
their energy source. Additionally, a law limiting the scope of energy mo-
nopolies would be beneficial so that emerging markets can operate freely.
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These are lofty goals, but in the end, the entrenched system will reach its
breaking point as renewable energy continues to disrupt the market.
I. FEDERAL ANTI-TRUST LAW
In this section, the Note will first describe the reason why anti-
trust law was enacted and describe the general legislation. Next, it will
explain the gaping exception to anti-trust law: namely, the State Action
Doctrine. Finally, California’s experiment in deregulation shows how state-
sponsored monopolies came to be favored despite the environmental and
economic benefits of renewable energy.
A. Basic Purpose of Anti-Trust Law
A capitalist society operates with bad incentives, such as the de-
sire to increase profits by cornering the market.19 Cornering the market
would make one actor more profitable but it would harm the market and
society overall.20 Key to this theory is understanding that rational actors
will chose to benefit themselves in the short term regardless of the neg-
ative external effects, and federal law understands this.21
To contain these market urges while still encouraging free trade,
Congress passed a series of regulatory statutes.22 In 1890, at the height
of the Industrial Revolution, Congress passed the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act23 because Congress feared that too much wealth would be concentrated
in the hands of too few people.24 The common practice for businesses was
to accumulate other business and form monopolies.25 To prevent business
elites from using monopolies to minimize competition, Congress mandated
19 Mark J. Perry & Robert Dell, The Battle for Capitalism and Freedom, HUFFINGTON
POST (Sept. 30, 2012), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/mark-j-perry-and-robert-dell/the
-battle-for-capitalism_b_1711510.html [https://perma.cc/XMQ7-Y728] (“Bad economic pol-
icy is misunderstood by the public as the product of bad actors, but the deeper story is
one of normal people performing under bad incentives”).
20 See INVESTOPEDIA, Corner A Market, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/cornera
market.asp [https://perma.cc/2MD9-XXMR] (last visited Apr. 4, 2018).
21 Id.
22 EARL W. KINTNER, AN ANTITRUST PRIMER 15 (Macmillan 2nd ed. 1973).
23 Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (1890).
24 “Vast accumulation of wealth in the hands of corporations and individuals. . . and the
widespread impression that their power had been and would be exerted to oppress in-
dividuals and injure the public generally.” KINTNER, supra note 22, at 15.
25 Id.
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that “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce . . . is hereby declared to be
illegal.”26 Courts interpreted “restraint of trade” to include price-fixing,27
amalgamation that results in elimination of competition, and agreements
not to compete in defined geographic areas.28
The Supreme Court thinks highly of the Sherman Act, opining
“[a]ntitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the
Magna Carta of free enterprise.”29 The Court goes on to say, “[t]hey are as
important to the preservation of economic freedom and our free-enterprise
system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental
personal freedoms.”30 But the Sherman Act does not govern intrastate
dealings.31 To preserve federalism, states rule over anti-trust issues that
do not affect interstate commerce.32 While federal anti-trust history guides
the states, it is the prerogative of the state to follow federal example.33
States can choose to allow monopolies that would be otherwise hampered
by federal law.34
B. State Action Doctrine
There are three main cases that define the limits of the State Action
Doctrine. First, in Parker v. Brown, the Supreme Court developed what
is known as the “Parker Doctrine.”35 Parker and its progeny defined three
instances in which a state can restrain competition: “(1) action by a state
itself; (2) action by a subdivision of a state—including a unit of local gov-
ernment or by a state agency; and (3) conduct of private parties pursuant
to the direction and supervision of the state or its subdivision.”36 In their
26 Sherman Antitrust Act § 1.
27 Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1979).
28 Atkin v. Union Processing Corp., 59 N.Y.2d 919, 921 (1983) (affirming Atkin v. Union
Processing Corp., 90 A.D.2d 332, 335–36 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982)).
29 United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
30 Id.
31 Sherman Anti-Trust Act § 1. However, federal courts have found intrastate transaction
to effect interstate commerce and thus applied federal anti-trust law to those mergers.
See generally Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
32 Alan Meese, Antitrust Federalism and State Restraints of Interstate Commerce: An
Essay for Professor Hovenkamp, 100 IOWA L. REV. 2161, 2169 (2015).
33 John J. Dvorske, Construction and Application of Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1 et seq.—
Supreme Court Cases, 35 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 1, 11.
34 Id. at 25.
35 See generally Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
36 Schwartz, supra note 13, at 1459.
2018] IT’S ALWAYS SUNNY IN FLORIDA 1057
decision, the Court noted the lack of specificity in federal anti-trust law
by saying “the Sherman Act makes no mention of the state as such, and
gives no hint that it was intended to restrain state action or official ac-
tion directed by a state.”37
In Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, the Court
discussed the issue of how to determine whether a state intended to in-
voke Parker.38 The Supreme Court developed a two-prong test for deter-
mining whether or not an anticompetitive action could be protected by
state directive.39 First, the court must ask if the action is part of a clearly
articulated state policy.40 Second, the court must ask if the state is ac-
tively supervising the implementation of the state policy.41 If these two
factors are met, the court will allow the restraint of trade.42 In Midcal,
the court found that California’s wine pricing system clearly violated the
Sherman Act.43 Nevertheless, the Court looked to the state involvement
in the scheme.44 California’s law adhered to an articulated policy and was
heavily supervised by the state.45 In the end, the Court allowed this state
action, even though it was a clear restraint of trade, because of the
state’s right to chose.46
Finally, Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference v. United States
clarified that private parties could be protected by State Action Doctrine,
even if their anticompetitive behavior was not expressly sanctioned by the
state.47 “The success of an antitrust action should depend upon the nature
of the activity challenged, rather than on the identity of the defendant.”48
The Supreme Court had two justifications for granting power to private
companies in these instances: “First, the Court concluded that it would
be unjust to find that a party violated federal law for doing nothing more
than obeying its state sovereign.”49 This gives private parties leeway in
interpreting the state directive. And second, “the Court concluded that
37 Parker, 317 U.S. at 351.
38 Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97, 99 (1980).




43 Id. at 103.
44 Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n, 445 U.S. at 103.
45 Id. at 105–06.
46 Id. at 111.
47 Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conf. v. U.S., 471 U.S. 48, 61 (1985).
48 Id. at 54.
49 Schwartz, supra note 13, at 1461.
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Congress did not necessarily intend to superimpose the antitrust laws as
an additional and possibly conflicting regulatory mechanism in areas of
the economy already regulated by the state.”50 While the Sherman Act
and anti-trust theory guides the states, it is the prerogative of the state
to follow these federal rules.51
II. FLORIDA
This section will consider how anti-trust law has trickled down to
Florida through the lenses of the State Action Doctrine and the Califor-
nia experiment that were discussed above. In applying the State Action
Doctrine, this section will recognize the Florida Public Service Commis-
sion, which acts as emissary of state policy to monopolies. Though the Pub-
lic Service Commission has serious flaws, it cannot be eliminated offhand.
A. Application of the State Action Doctrine in Florida
Under the State Action Doctrine, Florida has established legal,
state-sponsored monopolies for certain sectors, including public utilities.
Again, the Midcal factors require (1) an articulated state policy and (2) ac-
tive supervision of that policy. When applying the Midcal factors to Florida,
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals found that the state policy is artic-
ulated in Fla. Stat. § 366, which generally regulates public utilities.52
Next, the court found that the FPSC fulfills the second Midcal factor be-
cause it actively supervises the implementation of the state’s policy.53
The two Midcal factors are intertwined in Florida by design. Stat-
ute 366 explains how public utilities will be regulated in the state of
Florida and simultaneously creates the body to regulate them.54 First,
§ 366.02 defines public utilities as “every person, corporation, partnership,
association, or other legal entity and their lessees, trustees, or receivers
supplying electricity or gas . . . to or for the public within this state.”55
Then § 366.05 also establishes a FPSC with exclusive and superior juris-
diction over “electric utilities.”56
50 Id.
51 Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conf., 471 U.S. at 56.
52 Praxair, Inc. v. Florida Power & Light, 64 F.3d 609, 611 (11th Cir. 1995).
53 Id. at 612.
54 FLA. STAT. § 366 (2012).
55 Id. § .02.
56 Id. § 366.05.
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B. Florida’s History of Noncompetitiveness
Since its inception, the FPSC has approved agreements that would
not be allowed by the Federal Energy Regulatory Committee (the federal
body that handles the application of Sherman Act and anti-trust law in
the national energy sector).
The history of Florida’s energy sector development is rife with ex-
amples of anti-trust violations. In Gainesville v. Florida Power & Light,
an explicit territory based noncompetitive contract was allowed to pro-
ceed, depriving consumers of utility alternatives.57 Also in Praxair, Inc.
v. Florida Power & Light, a state-sponsored monopoly was allowed to
change the service provided to citizens with no chance for recourse.
Perhaps the FPSC’s most infamous decision came when the reg-
ulatory agency decided the limits of its own jurisdiction. § 366 specifically
excludes Rural Power Cooperatives from the FPSC’s regulatory scope,
but other entities are not mentioned in the rule.58 In a landmark decision
called PW Ventures Inc., v. Nichols, the FPSC expanded the scope of their
jurisdiction to include individual arrangements; that is, an exchange be-
tween two people.59
PW Ventures was a solar photovoltaic company that arranged to
provide solar energy producing equipment for Pratt’s industrial complex
in Palm Beach County.60 PW Ventures would have given the energy gen-
erated on Pratt’s land to Pratt under a long-term “take or pay” contract,61
which means that Pratt would have the first use of any energy gener-
ated, but must pay regardless of whether its total energy needs are met.62
However, the court found that these arrangements could “drasti-
cally change the regulatory scheme in this state”.63 The court character-
ized PW Ventures as a pirate of the industry, saying “[w]hat PW Ventures
57 Gainesville Utilities Dept. v. Florida Power & Light Co., 573 F.2d 292, 300, 303 (5th
Cir. 1978).
58 FLA. STAT. § 366.02.
59 PW Ventures, Inc. v. Nichols, 533 So.2d 281, 283–84 (Fla. 1988).
60 Id. at 282 n.1.
61 Id. at 282.
62 Stephen C. Hall & Morten A. Lund, Power Purchase Agreements: Distributed Gener-
ation Projects, http://www.agmrc.org/media/cms/Power_Purchase_Agreements__Distribu
_566FFDFD1AFF9.pdf [https://perma.cc/KHJ8-JQ8L] (last visited Apr. 4, 2018); see NORTON
ROSE FULBRIGHT, Structure of a solar power purchase agreement (June 2015), http://www
.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publications/134662/structure-of-a-solar-power-pur
chase-agreement [https://perma.cc/6R78-VKT9].
63 PW Ventures, Inc., 533 So.2d at 283.
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proposes is to go into an area served by a utility and take one of its major
customers.”64 Furthermore, the court speculated, other customers would
be forced to pay more for their electricity because Pratt’s consumption of
traditional energy would be reduced and thus revenue is lowered.65
In the end, the FPSC found that “any energy sales to an individ-
ual constituted a sale to the public, and thus would interfere with the
natural monopolies in place by the electric utilities in the state.”66 Later,
the Florida Supreme court upheld the FPSC decision.67 The decision in
PW Ventures set Florida on a path that deviates from most other states
in terms of viewing utilities.68 Other states make a distinction between
third-party developers (who mainly help homeowners and business own-
ers install solar panels) and state-sponsored monopolies.69 For example,
the Arizona Public Utility Commission ruled that third-party developers
like PW Ventures must “compete for business” and are not monopolies.70
The holding in PW Ventures severely impacted the availability of
third-party purchasing agreements (“PPAs”) in Florida.71 Put simply, a
PPA is an agreement between solar developer and purchaser.72 “The de-
veloper owns, finances, and maintains the PV system and is able to ob-
tain tax credits for these activities.”73 Typically, the developer installs the
solar panels for the building owner.74 PPAs make up a large percentage
of solar panel installations in homes across the country because develop-
ers assume the high initial costs of installation.75 However, under PW
Ventures, the developer in this arrangement is a “utility” as defined by
§ 366 because he is an individual providing electricity to the public and
64 Id.
65 Id. (“This revenue would have to be made up by the remaining customers of the regulated
utilities since the fixed costs of the regulated systems would not have been reduced”).
66 S.B. 640, 2012 Legis. Bill Hist. (Fla. 2012).
67 Id.
68 Bradley Klein, Legal Memorandum: Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) Financing for
Third-Party-Owned Renewable Energy Systems in Iowa 9, ENVTL. LAW & POL’Y CTR.




71 Ryann White, Three Steps to a Greener Tomorrow: Encouraging Solar Energy Develop-
ment in the Sunshine State, 31 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 263, 275 (2016).
72 Id. at 274.
73 Id.
74 Samuel Farkas, Third Party PPAs: Unleashing America’s Solar Potential, 28 J. LAND
USE & ENVTL. L. 91, 112 (2012).
75 Id. at 93.
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he is thus subject to the same regulations as energy giants.76 Thus, prevent-
ing the developer from disrupting the existing state-sponsored monopoly.
The FPSC maintains that regulation of third-party PPAs is fact-
specific.77 Nevertheless, it is clear that the FPSC protects the status quo
and ipso facto favors state-sponsored energy monopolies.
C. Issues with FPSC
As described above, the FPSC gives energy companies far-reach-
ing ability to restrain competition. On appeals, Florida courts tend to give
extreme deference to FPSC.78 This means that courts continue practices
considered egregious anti-trust violations by the Federal Energy Regula-
tory Committee (“FERC”). Because Florida courts grant such wide defer-
ence to the FPSC, there is no way to tell if the Commission or the courts
apply a separate legal standard consistently. Indeed, judges lament the
tradition of deference. “Once again we have a case where the FPSC has
approved a territorial agreement between two utilities over the objec-
tions of a large number of consumers of one of the utilities,” Judge Ervin
opined in a dissenting opinion.79 Though the Supreme Court noted strong
citizen outrage, it decided not to overturn the FPSC, saying “[t]he powers
of the Commission over these privately-owned utilities is omnipotent
within the confines of the statute and the limits of organic law.”80
The FPSC also faces claims of corruption81 and FPSC is often re-
ferred to as a “revolving door.”82 Reporters claim that the commissioners
are rewarded for a pro-monopolistic decision with a cushy, well-paying job
at the selfsame utility company they judged. Former Florida Public Ser-
vice Commission chairwoman Nancy Argenziano explained to local news
76 FLA. STAT. § 366.04(2)(c).
77 Choctawhatchee Elec. Coop. v. Graham, 132 So. 3d 208, 215 (Fla. 2014) (“[W]e are
mindful of the highly fact-specific nature of the territorial disputes that come before
the Commission.”)
78 See infra note 82.
79 Storey v. Mayo, 217 So. 2d 304, 308 (Fla. 1968).
80 Id. at 307.
81 Tim Dickinson, The Koch Brother’s Dirty War on Solar Energy, ROLLING STONE (Feb. 11,
2016), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/the-koch-brothers-dirty-war-on-solar
-power-20160211 [https://perma.cc/WL5Z-H4PW]; Mary Ellen Klas, Group says power
companies wield too much influence in Legislature, MIAMI HERALD (Mar. 30, 2014), http://
www.miamiherald.com/news/state/article2087902.html [https://perma.cc/38EE-3JBF].
82 Keith Laing, Analysis: Truth to criticism of Florida PSC, HERALD-TRIB. (Oct. 10, 2010),
http://www.heraldtribune.com/news/20101023/analysis-truth-to-criticism-of-florida-psc
[https://perma.cc/96DC-ALW8].
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outlets upon resigning, “I tell you that in my weirdest nightmare, I would
not have expected to come upon the corruption, the bought-and-sold na-
ture of everything related to the operation of the PSC.”83 Argenziano took
the chairwoman position after her predecessor, Matt Carter, improperly
communicated with utility lobbyists.84 Matt Carter actually backed the
pro-utility Amendment One in 2016,85 giving credence to the “revolving
door” accusations.
In light of these issues, it appears that the FPSC inadequately
serves the state and instead serves the interest of the investor owned,
state-sponsored monopolies. If determined to be the case, Florida fails to
meet the State Action Doctrine expounded by the Supreme Court. The
Doctrine is designed to protect consumers, and subpar performance of
the FPSC undermines its statutory intent.
D. Policy Justifications
Still, there are policy justifications for some state regulations un-
der the FPSC despite claims of ineffectiveness and corruption. First, one
purpose of the FPSC is preventing duplicative efforts.86 The first justifi-
cation is explicitly enumerated in statutory language.87 It makes sense—
multiple producers of power that generate from disparate sources could
lead to power lines laid one on top of each other en route to homes and
businesses. In fact, most states with Public Service Commissions articu-
late a desire to streamline the distribution process.88 In addition to eco-
nomic waste, this system could potentially be an eyesore: just look at the
electric wires in Thailand’s urban centers.89
83 Id.
84 Julie Patel, PSC member reigns as agency begins deliberations of ethics, SUN SENTINEL
(Oct. 5, 2009), http://www.sun-sentinel.com/business/sfl-psc-conferences-100609-story
.html [https://web.archive.org/web/*/http://www.sun-sentinel.com/business/sfl-psc-confer
ences-100609-story.html].
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Second, the FPSC is responsible for ensuring that all Floridians
have power when they reach for their light switch. It is important to con-
sider California as a powerful counterexample. After the Southern Motor
Carriers ruling, states questioned the power given to energy companies
within their states.90 California believed that renewable energy could be-
come more feasible, but power companies would have no incentive to up-
date their infrastructure. This would negatively impact the environment
because most traditional companies used coal.91 The state was unsure if
alternative energy could displace such an entrenched system without
competition.92 Furthermore, the way large companies structured their en-
ergy purchases could lock residents into poor economic deals.93 By 1998,
three states (California, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island) attempted to
introduce competition to their energy markets.94 The most important state
was California, whose enormous economy is comparable to some small
countries.95 California attempted to deregulate their energy market by im-
plementing a series of programs.96 “Retail rates under the restructuring
system were frozen until utilities recovered stranded costs or until March
2002.”97 Additionally, the state imposed a 10% price cut to consumers.98
This had the opposite of the intended effect: “this discouraged consumers
from shifting to alternative retail suppliers even though it was allowed.”99
Next, California barred “hedging” and forced companies to buy at that
moment’s price.100 This left power companies on the hook for the differ-
ence between wholesale and retail price.101 By outlawing creative financial
solutions, California forced its power companies to parity.102 Finally, for the
energy produced out of state, sellers took advantage of the companies’
90 Farkas, supra note 74, at 99.
91 Powering a Generation, NAT’L MUSEUM OF AM. HIST., http://americanhistory.si.edu/pow
ering/generate/gnmain.htm [https://perma.cc/W8TF-RRBJ] (last visited Apr. 4, 2018).
92 Peter Navarro, The Argument for Radical Deregulation, HARV. BUS. REV. 112, 112 (1996);
Theo Mullen, Unseating the Electrical Utilities’ Monopoly, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11, 1990),
https://www.nytimes.com/1990/03/11/business/unseating-the-electrical-utilities-mo
nopoly.html [https://perma.cc/KNR3-DKM5].
93 Farkas, supra note 74, at 99.
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shortage and legal requirement to provide natural gas.103 “Some of the
gas supply companies declined to sell natural gas to the integrated electric
and gas utility companies in California that were required by law to serve
residential and other natural gas customers.”104 It is clear that California’s
“de-regulation” provided crippling regulations for energy companies.
Disaster struck on January 17, 2001 when the first rolling black-
out hit California since World War II.105 California’s Governor Davis de-
clared a state of emergency, citing an “imminent threat of widespread and
prolonged disruption of electrical power.”106 Eventually, California’s de-
regulation failed. Because of California’s drastic results, most states have
not implemented widespread energy sector deregulation.107
These policy justifications are in alignment with Florida’s in-
tention in designing this regulatory scheme and they are also helpful for
larger human rights goals. The FPSC considers itself a vanguard of the
grid system.108 Their website touts the Commission’s role in providing en-
ergy to every citizen.109 Indeed, implicit in its rate-fixing system is the
idea that access to the market (especially for a necessary item) should not
have an unattainable price tag.110 This is important because access to en-
ergy may as well be a human right.111 Humans need it to function in so-
ciety. Especially in America, our daily lives begin with an alarm clock and
end with flipping a light switch. Most of our communications and func-
tions are made possible by electricity.
Finally, it is important to remember California’s debacle in dereg-
ulation. Because of all of these factors, it is clear that Florida cannot simply
eliminate the FPSC while these justifications still exist.
103 Id. at 259–60.
104 Id.
105 PBS, The California Crisis: California Timeline, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/front
line/shows/blackout/california/timeline.html [https://perma.cc/S4XR-QA2Q] (last visited
Apr. 4, 2018).
106 Ferrey, surpa note 15, at 263.
107 This is especially true in Florida. Florida Panel Eyes Deregulation, ST. AUGUSTINE REC-
ORD (Feb. 1, 2001), http://staugustine.com/stories/020101/sta_0201010031.shtml#.WKmw
-mXaHu8 [https://web.archive.org/web/*/http://staugustine.com/stories/020101/sta_0201
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be fears of California’s post-deregulation situation, with rolling blackouts there spooking
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III. RECOMMENDATIONS
This Note does not call for the complete elimination of energy regu-
lation. As discussed in the policy section above and considering California’s
experience, it is clear that some regulation must stay in place. Still, the
issues that plague the FPSC necessitate decentralizing the regulatory
scheme. The first recommendation concerns the physical nature of solar
energy. Decentralization would better harness solar power’s peaking na-
ture. The second recommendation concerns the financing of solar energy.
A. Decentralization
The current energy system thrives on its elaborate infrastruc-
ture. However, this infrastructure is at odds with the innovative strides
in renewable energy. All forms of energy would ideally be consumed al-
most simultaneously to their production.112 Solar energy specifically is a
peaking energy generation.113 However, energy is at peak production
during peak demand,114 especially in hot, humid Florida where air con-
ditioning accounts for approximately 40% of a homeowners’ annual util-
ity bill.115 Solar panels are ideal for homeowners who could use the energy
as it is produced; however, the bulk of solar energy production occurs on
massive fields run by entrenched power utilities.116 Thus, energy is wasted
in the transport, and large utilities are chained to the streamlined man-
agement of their energy production sites. Breaking up large investor
owner monopolies would allow them to form “micro-grids.”117 Further-
more, authority could likewise be decentralized to allow for more localized
112 Javier Silvente et al., Simultaneous energy supply and demand management in micro-
grids: A comparative study of MILP formulations, 155 APPLIED ENERGY 486 (2016).
113 John Miller, Why Expanded Alternative Energy Increases the Need for Natural Gas, EN-
ERGY COLLECTIVE (Jan. 29, 2013), http://www.theenergycollective.com/jemiller_ep/178096/ex
panded-wind-and-solar-power-increase-need-natural-gas [https://perma.cc/T5GH-V5MA].
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115 DEL-AIR, Florida Air-Conditioning Costs: Tips to Lower Your Bill During the Summer
Heat (July 26, 2016), http://www.delair.com/florida-air-conditioning-costs-tips-lower-bill
-summer-heat/ [https://perma.cc/3X7D-JGAZ].
116 Silvente et al., supra note 112, at 486.
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Check In India, FORBES (Oct. 13, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ucenergy/2016/10/13
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enforcement.118 Overall, decentralization would allow for homeowner self-
generation and decrease energy waste.
B. Allow Third-Party Power Purchasing Agreements
This will not be the first or last academic paper to advocate for
third-party PPAs in Florida. Prior research identifies several benefits of
PPAs. First, the cost of solar energy stabilizes under long-term third-party
PPAs.119 “Electricity consumers have witnessed . . . an average annual
increase of 4.1% on U.S. retail electricity costs from 2005 to 2010. Third-
party PPAs allow customers the opportunity to negotiate a long-term con-
tract that specifies a predetermined price for a twenty to twenty-five year
duration.”120 This type of stability is currently reserved for utility com-
panies and not homeowners or business owners. Allowing PPAs would also
be beneficial to developers who take the risk of installing solar panels.
Furthermore, it satisfies the intent of the pro-solar amendment.
In 2011, the Florida legislature attempted to repeal PW Ventures
by removing third-party developers from regulation as utilities.121 Under
this bill, a “public utility” would not include the “developer of a renew-
able energy generation facility . . . that is located on the premises of a
host consumer or group of host consumers, including, without limitation,
residential, commercial, industrial, institutional, or agricultural host cus-
tomers located on the same or contiguous property, all subject to the
aggregate gross power limitation.”122 It further lessened regulation when
such a developer “supplies electricity exclusively for sale to the host con-
sumer or consumers for consumption on the premises only and contiguous
property owned or leased by the host consumer or consumers, regardless
of interruptions in contiguity caused by easements, public thoroughfares,
transportation rights-of-way, or utility rights-of-way.”123 However, this
bill failed.124 In the years since, Floridians took to the ballot box and made
their voices heard by accepting the pro-solar amendment and rejecting
118 See generally Scott Stromberg, Has the Sun Set on Solar rights? Examining the Prac-
ticality of the Solar Rights Acts, 50 NAT. RES. J. 211 (2010) (explaining localized enforce-
ment of solar rights).
119 Farkas, supra note 74, at 99.
120 Id.
121 H.R. 1349, 2011 Leg. (Fla. 2011).
122 Id.
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the pro-utility amendment.125 Going forward, the Florida executive branch
and the courts need to interpret Amendment Four to repeal PW Ventures
and allow PPAs.
C. More Homeowner Tax Incentives
Often, the arguments to allow third-party PPAs are paired with
calls for tax incentives to lower the cost of home solar energy even fur-
ther.126 Instead, I propose that tax incentives are not the best way for-
ward. While tax incentives are important to initially lowering cost barriers
to home solar energy, they are not a sustainable, long-term solution.
Of course, citizens want to take advantage of tax credits; however,
it is easier for large, investor-owned corporations to take advantage due
to their large tax equity.127 This is why third-party PPAs are attractive
to developers.128 “Developers are better situated than ordinary power con-
sumers to reap the maximum reward for PV investment . . . individuals
and entities that do not have a sufficiently large tax bill will not be able
to fully maximize the benefits.”129 Therefore, tax incentives could be ben-
eficial if the government interprets the pro-solar amendment correctly
because it would lower costs across the board.
Also, large public utilities, the same companies that tried to squash
Florida’s home solar panel development, adopted solar panel generation
and reaped the tax benefits.130 In 2015, Duke Energy used solar plants
to supplement their traditional methods of electricity by installing large-
scale solar panel fields.131 Less than one year later, Florida Power & Light,
125 “The Solar Amendment would override any existing, and prevent any future, state or
local regulation to control duplication of facilities.” Lynne Holt & Mary Galligan, Florida’s
Proposed Constitutional Amendment on Local Solar Electricity Supply, 28 ELECTRICITY
J. 66, 72 (2015).
126 See, e.g., White, supra note 71, at 272.
127 Felix Mormann, Beyond Tax Credits: Smarter Tax Policy for a Cleaner, More Dem-
ocratic Energy Future, 31 YALE J. ON REG. 303, 324 (2014).
128 Farkas, supra note 74, at 100 (Farkas writes: “Developers are better situated than
ordinary power consumers to reap the maximum reward for PV investment. Solar energy
developers operate with the advantage of ‘knowing the business’. . . .Similarly, individ-
uals and entities that do not have a sufficiently large tax bill will not be able to fully max-
imize the benefits. Some incentives, such as the MACRS, do not apply to homeowners and
non-taxable entities. Therefore, third-party contractors are better situated to achieve a
full utilization of the available benefits, which allows them to transfer the cost savings
to the site-host.”).
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one of the largest public utility companies in Florida, built new energy
production sites with over one million solar plants.132 Florida Power &
Light paired with Next Energy Inc., a solar startup, to develop these
plants.133 But, there is no incentive for Florida Power & Light to change
how it interacts with its customers. Customers have no choice for self-
generation. Next Energy Inc. is a subsidiary of Florida Power & Light be-
cause Florida’s usage relationship does not allow them to be independent.
Thus, tax incentives do not provide overly compelling incentives for home-
owners to pay the high cost of installing solar panels. While the tax cred-
its are essential to establishing solar panels for users with large equity,
they do not advance energy sufficient or energy positive homes.134 More-
over, federal tax schemes are often only effective when supplemented by
state policy to allow solar technology.135 Politics can influence tax pro-
grams; the same program of incentives implemented in one election cycle
can be stripped four years later.136 Though solar developers sell long-term
contracts, they have no guarantee that tax benefit programs will last.137
Thus, Florida should not rely on tax incentives to power a long-term so-
lar investment strategy.
D. A Solar Right
Customers should not be bereft of choice. In this next section, this
Note will discuss methods for disrupting the energy monopolies with so-
lar technology.
 As discussed above,138 as solar panels become more efficient, the de-
velopment of solar energy is moving towards more modular uptake.139 This
132 Waquas Azeem, FPL begins construction on three Florida solar plants, SNL RENEW-
ABLE ENERGY WEEKLY (Feb. 12, 2016).
133 Id.
134 Although, the recently passed pro-solar amendment should counter this problem.
135 Mormann, supra note 127, at 317.
136 Stephen Lacey, Repealing the Investment Tax Credit Could Cut the US Solar Market
in Half, GREEN TECH MEDIA (Nov. 15, 2016), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles
/read/repealing-the-investment-tax-credit-could-cut-Americas-solar-market-in-half
[https://perma.cc/SDA5-L25A].
137 Clare Magee, Is the Long-Term PPA Becoming Outdated for Corporate Renewables
Procurement?, GREEN TECH MEDIA (Aug. 2, 2016), https://www.greentechmedia.com/arti
cles/read/corporate-renewables-procurement-must-evolve-beyond-the-long-term-ppa
[https://perma.cc/86P3-64C8].
138 See supra notes 113–19.
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development is at odds with the grid-like system employed by Florida
Power & Light and other traditional state-sponsored monopolies. Still,
the entrenched state-sponsored monopolies attempt to undermine these vic-
tories. Thus, there is a demonstrated need to secure the right to solar en-
ergy with comprehensive legislation. Yet as in the battle of amendments
discussed in the beginning of this Note, Florida’s citizens are not looking
to maintain the status quo; rather, they want to establish a new system
based on the option of home solar generation. A long-term solution would
guarantee a right to solar generation and the energy produced thenceforth.
Floridians should look west for innovative ways to secure their
right to sunshine. Within a few years of each other, Wyoming and New
Mexico both passed solar rights acts.140 These laws were based on the
western notion of water rights, where the first person to put the water to
beneficial use is granted ownership.141 While there is no such history in
Florida, the idea is applicable because harnessing energy and protecting
the environment are undoubtedly beneficial uses. While New Mexico’s
solar rights act needed to be reformed,142 Wyoming’s rights simply enu-
merate the right to access solar energy and the right to use it.143 The law
is enforced primarily at the local level.144 The meat of this new act should
focus on the right to generate one’s own electricity. It should include lan-
guage about the right to sell and extinguish property rights.
A solar right might add nuance to the third-party PPA develop-
ments because it would call for negotiation of the right along with the fi-
nancial contract negotiations. However, this is a small price to pay in the
battle to defend Florida’s citizens from state-sponsored power monopolies.
Two events at the ballot box (the passage of the pro-solar amend-
ment and the repudiation of the pro-utility amendment) prove that Flor-
ida’s citizens desire rights to solar energy in some form. The Florida Court
of Appeals have contemplated this issue, and it has not been rejected.145
Additionally, a right to solar generation would fit nicely with the existing
hodgepodge of solar protection laws. Finally, Florida could look to exist-
ing solar rights acts in other states for inspiration and lessons learned.
energy.gov/energysaver/small-solar-electric-systems [https://perma.cc/B9UG-SLZK] (last
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The pro-solar amendment was initially criticized for being too broad
and vague.146 Indeed, the amendment touches upon “rate, service and ter-
ritory regulations . . . and imposition by electric utilities of special rates,
fees, charges, tariffs, or terms and conditions.”147 Instead of empowering
home-owning consumers, the amendment sought to tear at the fabric of the
state-sponsored monopolies. Still, the Florida Supreme Court recognized
that, though inartfully worded, “[t]he provisions encompass[] a single plan
and merely enumerate[ ] various elements necessary to accomplish the
plan.”148 The courts understood that a cohesive plan was required to truly
make the amendment feasible. Furthermore, Floridians rejected the pro-
utility amendment, which proves a desire to upend the regulations im-
posed by state-sponsored monopolies.
A right to solar self-generation may seem radical; however, the
courts have not expressly rejected such a right. In PW Ventures, the court
ruled, “[t]he legislature determined that the protection of the public in-
terest required only limiting competition in the sale of electric service,
not a prohibition against self-generation.”149 At the same time they lim-
ited developer solar panels, the court also explicitly left open the possibil-
ity that such a right could be granted to citizens.
Floridians have won several small but hard fought battles for the
right to solar panels and solar production.150 The result of such small le-
gal victories is a hodgepodge of protection—a shield riddled with holes.
While no statute or rule in Florida currently provides electricity
consumers with the specific right “to own or lease solar equipment installed
on their property to generate electricity for their own use,” several statutes
operate as if such a right is forthcoming.151 For instance, Fla. Stat. § 163.04
prevents homeowners’ associations and others from prohibiting the in-
stallation of “solar collectors, clotheslines, or other energy devices.”152 But
this same statute makes no mention of the right to own or lease solar
equipment or the use of solar electricity.153 Also, Fla. Admin. Code 25-6.065
146 Advisory Op. to the Att’y Gen. re Rights of Elec. Consumers Regarding Solar Energy
Choice, 188 So.2d 822, 830–31 (Fla. 2016).
147 Advisory Op. to the Att’y Gen. re Limits or Prevents Barriers to Local Solar Electricity
Supply, 177 So.3d 235, 240 (Fla. 2015).
148 Id. at 244.
149 PW Ventures, 533 So.2d at 284.
150 White, supra note 71, at 280–81.
151 Advisory Opinion, 188 So.3d at 828.
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153 Id.
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explains how citizens can receive expedited grid interconnection and net-
metering, which is only applicable to citizens with energy generated at
their property.154 But this rule does not create a right for consumers to own
or lease solar equipment.155 Furthermore, the rule does not address the in-
stallation of solar equipment.156 These examples prove that a right to solar
energy self-generation would fit within the current legislative framework.
In fact, guaranteeing such a right may even make the laws more logical.
CONCLUSION
For decades, renewable energy has grown and developed. It has
been embraced by homeowners, businesses, and local and federal govern-
ment. The benefits are clear: renewable energy is good for the environ-
ment and cheap to produce. Solar energy in particular is ideal for home-
owners and small business. However, only certain groups were able to take
advantage of renewable energy’s lower costs.
Florida government has a close relationship with its state-sponsored
monopolies. These monopolies do fall within the State Action Doctrine
because Florida statute created the monopolies and a regulatory agency in
the Florida Public Service Commission. One of the FPSC’s most notorious
cases was PW Ventures v. Nichols. In this case, the Florida Supreme Court
affirmed a decision to limit access to financing options for solar energy.
The FPSC has faced claims of corruption and inadequacy, but the
valid justifications for electricity utility mean that it cannot simply be
eliminated. Some ways to reform this system while relying on its merits
include decentralization and allowing third-party power purchasing agree-
ments in some form. While most critics of Florida’s energy sector clamor
for tax incentives, these incentives do not solve the issue of increasing
homeowner generation.
Looking forward, Florida should consider a solar rights act that
guarantees citizens the right to home generation. Though this may seem
like a radical proposal, other states have adopted such acts. The act would
help ensure that homeowners’ access to solar energy is not limited by state-
sponsored monopolies.
The timing could not be better; citizen participation at the ballot box
proves that Floridians are ready for a new relationship with their energy
suppliers. In fact, they demand a choice in how their energy is produced.
154 FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 25-6.065 (2018).
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